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We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on different regular graphs as a function of the
noise level underlying strategy adoptions. We focus on the effects that are brought about by different group
sizes of public goods games in which individuals participate, revealing that larger groups of players may induce
qualitatively different behavior when approaching the deterministic limit of strategy adoption. While by pairwise
interactions an intermediate uncertainty by strategy adoptions may ensure optimal conditions for the survival of
cooperators at a specific graph topology, larger groups warrant this only in the vicinity of the deterministic limit
independently from the underlying graph. These discrepancies are attributed to the indirect linkage of otherwise
not directly connected players, which is brought about by joint memberships within the larger groups. Thus, we
show that increasing the group size may introduce an effective transition of the interaction topology, and that
the latter shapes the noise dependence of the evolution of cooperation in case of pairwise interactions only.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Public goods are prone to exploitations by individuals who
want to reap benefits on the expense of others. Such situa-
tions, in which actions ensuring or enhancing individual pros-
perity harm collective wellbeing, are known as social dilem-
mas [1]. Cooperation is regarded as the strategy leading away
from the impending social decline [2]. However, the evolution
of cooperation is at odds with the defecting strategy, which
promises higher individual payoffs and is thus more likely to
spread in a success-driven environment where the evolution-
ary process is governed by the imitation of the more success-
ful strategy. Indeed, sustenance of cooperation within groups
of selfish individuals is a challenge faced by scientists across
different fields of research ranging from sociology and ecol-
ogy to economics [3]. The subtleties of cooperation within
groups of selfish individuals are most frequently investigated
within the framework of evolutionary game theory [4, 5, 6, 7].
While the prisoner’s dilemma game is unrivaled in popular-
ity when it comes to studying the evolution of cooperation
through pairwise interactions, the closely related public goods
game accounts for group interactions as well. Within the latter
cooperators contribute to the public good whereas defectors
do not. All contributions are summed and multiplied by an
enhancement factor r > 1, and subsequently equally divided
among all players irrespective of their strategies. Thus, defec-
tors bear no costs when collecting identical benefits as cooper-
ators, which ultimately results in widespread defection. This
theoretical prediction, however, disagrees with experimental
findings [8], and accordingly, several mechanisms have been
proposed that facilitate the evolution of cooperation in pub-
lic goods games. Punishment in particular seems to be a vi-
able route to cooperative behavior [9, 10, 11], but it raises the
so-called second-order free rider problem where cooperators
exploit the additional investments of punishers [12]. Further-
more, the effectiveness of such actions depends on whether
the participation in public goods game is optional or not [13].
Social diversity [14] and volunteering [15] may also promote
cooperation in public goods games, as does the relaxation of
strategy adoption criteria to account for mutation and random
exploration of available strategies [16].
Apart from the mainstream efforts focusing on the iden-
tification of mechanisms promoting cooperation, the public
goods game attracted considerable interest also from the view-
point of phenomena that are of interest to physicists, espe-
cially in view of spatial public goods games [17], being inter-
esting and realistic extensions of the well-mixed case. Phase
transitions in spatial public goods games have been investi-
gated in [18]. It was shown that pattern formation, previ-
ously identified in the contexts of excitable media for exam-
ple [19], may also underly the evolution of ecological pub-
lic goods [20]. Public goods games have also been studied
in different geometries in view of the importance of volun-
tary and compulsory interactions [21], whereas the impact of
continuous spatial structure on the success of altruistic behav-
ior has been investigated in [22]. Effects of inhomogeneous
player activities and noise on cooperation in spatial public
goods games have been examined in [23]. Importantly, it has
been reported that noise, originating from mistakes in strat-
egy adoptions or misinterpretations of individual fitness [24],
plays a crucial role by the evolution of cooperation, resulting
even in a non-monotonous outlay of cooperator density in de-
pendence on the noise intensity. Qualitatively similar findings
were reported for the impact of diversity on cooperation in
spatial public goods games [25]. This is in agreement with re-
sults reported earlier for the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
[26, 27], although there the particular structure of the interac-
tion topology has been found crucial for the noise dependence
of the evolution of cooperation.
Here we aim to examine whether the interaction topology
by public goods games plays a similarly crucial role. We
therefore consider public goods games on different types of
regular graphs, whereby focusing specifically on the impact of
different group sizes of players participating in every instance
of the game. Notably, we focus on regular graphs (where
each node is connected to z neighbors) to avoid effects orig-
inating from heterogeneous interaction structures [14]. First,
we employ square and honeycomb spatial lattices represent-
2FIG. 1: Schematic presentation of employed spatial lattices that lack
overlapping triangles. Left: square lattice. Right: honeycomb lattice.
In both panels the gray shaded region encompasses players that en-
gage in a round of the public goods game. Due to the extension of the
group size G from two (pairwise interaction; G = 2) to five (left) or
four (right) players, individuals denoted by white circles surrounding
the focal player (black circle) become effectively connected via the
public goods game.
ing regular graphs where the overlapping triangles are miss-
ing. Accordingly, these interaction topologies have a cluster-
ing coefficient equal to zero. The latter structural feature has
been found crucial for the evolution of cooperation within the
prisoner’s dilemma game when approaching the deterministic
limit of strategy adoption [7, 26, 28]. In particular, while in
the absence of overlapping triangles cooperators fail to sur-
vive in the deterministic limit, cooperative behavior thrives
in the opposite case, i.e. when the interaction structure con-
tains overlapping triangles, as is the case by triangular (z = 6)
or kagome (z = 4) lattices that we consider also presently.
The premise of this work relies on the assumption that aban-
doning pairwise interactions, as is commonly the case by the
prisoner’s dilemma game, and allowing for the more gen-
eral group interactions within the framework of public goods
games can lead to qualitatively different results. Figure 1 fea-
tures a schematic representation of the square and honeycomb
lattice, whereby the gray shaded areas encompass G = z + 1
players belonging to the same group when engaging in a round
of the public goods game. Evidently, due to the joint member-
ship there appear indirect links between otherwise not directly
connected players, which in turn introduce effective overlap-
ping triangles to the interaction structure. In what follows, we
will investigate the impact of this fact on the noise dependence
of the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
the next section we describe the employed evolutionary public
goods game, and in Section III we present the results. Lastly,
we summarize the main findings and compare them with re-
sults reported earlier for other spatial evolutionary games.
II. PUBLIC GOODS GAME
The public goods game is staged on a regular interaction
graph, as schematically depicted in Fig. 1, whereon initially
each player on site x is designated either as a cooperator
(sx = C) or as a defector (sx = D) with equal probabil-
ity. Depending on the group size G, each selected player x
acquires its payoff Px by accumulating its share of the pub-
lic good from all groups with which it is affiliated (e.g. if
G = 5 there exist five such groups on the square lattice; see
Fig. 1), whereby cooperators contribute to the public good
with an asset a = 1while defectors contribute nothing. Subse-
quently, the total contribution that accumulates within a group
is multiplied by the enhancement factor r and divided equally
among all players irrespective of their strategy. Employing
the Monte Carlo simulation procedure, each elementary step
involves randomly selecting one player x and one of its neigh-
bors y. Following the accumulation of payoffs Px and Py as
described above, player x tries to enforce its strategy sx on
player y in accordance with the probability
W (sx → sy) =
1
1 + exp[(Py − Px)/K]
, (1)
whereK denotes the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [7]. In
K → 0 limit player x always succeeds in enforcing its strat-
egy to player y if only Px > Py but never otherwise. For
K > 0, however, strategies performing worse may also be
adopted based on unpredictable variations in payoffs or er-
rors in the decision making, for example. During a Monte
Carlo step (MCS) all players will have a chance to pass their
strategy once on average. For the results presented below we
used lattices having L = 400 to 1600 linear size and up to
105 MCS before determining the fraction of cooperators ρC
within the whole population. Importantly, to account for dif-
ferent group sizes affecting the absolute values of the payoffs,
and thus indirectly influencing also r and K , the latter two
parameters must be considered normalized with G to ensure
relevant comparisons of results, similarly as has been done
recently in [14].
III. RESULTS
We start by presenting results obtained on the square lattice
for G = 2 (pairwise interactions) and G = 5 in Fig. 2. The
dependence of ρC on the normalized enhancement factor r re-
veals that larger groups are able to sustain cooperative behav-
ior by lower values of r/G than smaller groups. In agreement
with the fact that cooperation is more difficult to sustain for
lower enhancement factors, we may argue that larger groups
facilitate the survival of cooperators. On the other hand, r/G
required for complete cooperator dominance rises slightly as
the group size is enlarged, which in turn relativises the pre-
ceding statement. Irrespective of this, results presented in
Fig. 2 evidence clearly that group size plays a decisive role
by the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game on
the square lattice. Notably, we obtained qualitatively identical
results for the honeycomb lattice (not shown).
Elaborating further on the impact of different group sizes
on the evolution of cooperation, we present in Fig. 3 the full
K − r phase diagram for the square lattice at G = 2 (top)
and G = 5 (bottom). As could be concluded already from
results presented in Fig. 2, larger groups indeed lower the en-
hancement factor that is needed to sustain cooperation. The
phase diagram reveals further that this is true irrespective of
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FIG. 2: Density of cooperators ρC in dependence on the normalized
(see main text for details) enhancement factor r for the square lattice
at G = 2 (open squares) and G = 5 (filed squares). Note that large
groups can sustain cooperation by lower enhancement factors than
small groups. The uncertainty by strategy adoptions was K/G =
0.1.
K . Moreover, it is also evident that r/G required for ρC = 1
rises with larger G, and that this trend is also largely inde-
pendent of K . The most interesting feature, however, is the
qualitatively different behavior of the phase boundaries when
approaching the K → 0 limit. Focusing on the lower phase
boundary separating the mixed C +D and pure D phases, it
is easy to observe that at G = 2 there exist an intermediate
value of K by which the lowest r still ensures the survival
of at least some cooperators. The final result in the strong
(K → 0) and weak (K → ∞) selection limit is identical,
yielding r = G as the phase transition point between C and
D phases. Although brought about by a different spatiotem-
poral evolution of the two strategies, the application of the
two extreme noise levels wipes out the impact of spatiality if
pairwise interactions (G = 2) are considered. On the other
hand, at G = 5 the trend of the lower curve is monotonically
descending towards the K → 0 limit, which is in sharp con-
trast with the G = 2 case. Indeed, while the latter implies
the existence of an optimal level of uncertainty for the evo-
lution of cooperation, as was previously reported in [26, 27]
for the prisoner’s dilemma game, the G = 5 case lacks this
feature, in turn posing questions with respect to the role of the
interaction structure. In particular, the inverted bell-shaped
outlay of the critical r/G needed to sustain cooperation in the
top panel of Fig. 2 can be seen equivalent to the bell-shaped
outlay of the critical temptation to defect in dependence on
K reported earlier for the prisoner’s dilemma game (see e.g.
Fig. 32 in [7]). However, for the prisoner’s dilemma game
this feature can be observed only if the interaction graph lacks
overlapping triangles, whereas for lattices like the kagome, or
the regular graph consisting of overlapping triangles, the bell-
shaped dependence vanishes and becomes qualitatively iden-
tical to the monotonous outlay of the critical r/G depicted in
the bottom panel of Fig. 3. Thus, the conclusion imposes that
the increase in the group size from G = 2 to G = 5 on the
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FIG. 3: K − r phase diagrams for the square lattice at G = 2 (top)
and G = 5 (bottom). The upper (lower) line denotes the phase
boundary between the mixedC+D and homogeneous C (D) phases.
Note the qualitative difference of the lower phase boundary as it ap-
proaches the K → 0 limit, emerging due to the application of differ-
ent group sizes G.
square lattice effectively alters the interaction topology in that
the joint membership in the larger groups indirectly links the
otherwise not linked players.
In order to strengthen the above-outlined reasoning, we
have studied the full K − r phase diagram for the honeycomb
lattice at G = 2 and G = 4 as well. As expected, the lack of
overlapping triangles results in an inverted bell-shaped depen-
dence of the critical r/G values constituting the C +D → D
border line in case of pairwise interactions (G = 2). More
importantly still, the increase of the group size from G = 2 to
G = 4 induces an identical qualitative change in the outlay of
the critical r/G values when approaching the K → 0 limit as
we have observed for the square lattice in Fig. 3. In particular,
the phase boundary between the mixed C + D and homo-
geneous D phases is monotonically descending towards the
K → 0 limit, which is in sharp contrast with the G = 2 case.
Reiterating the above argumentation for results presented in
Fig. 3, we thus confirm that larger group sizes can alter the ef-
fective interaction topology, in turn substantially affecting the
evolution of cooperation in public goods games.
We note that our observations are not restricted to lattices
but remain valid also for other interaction topologies having a
low clustering coefficient. For example, we have employed a
random regular graph with the degree of each player equal to
z = 4, whereby the lack of overlapping triangles and the di-
rectly related negligible clustering coefficient result in a sim-
ilar noise-dependence of cooperation as depicted in Fig. 3.
Namely, using G = 2 cooperators are optimally sustained at
a finite value of K , yet this changes sharply if larger groups
(e.g. G = 5) are considered. In the latter case, as we have
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FIG. 4: K − r phase diagrams for the triangular lattice at G = 2
(top) and G = 7 (bottom). Note that the approach of the lower phase
boundary towards the K → 0 limit is independent on the group size
G.
observed for the above-mentioned lattices, the deterministic
limit (K → 0) yields an optimal environment for the evolu-
tion of cooperation at a given value of r < G. Importantly,
since the reasoning of cooperation promotion via overlapping
triangles for the prisoner’s dilemma game (see e.g. Fig. 33
in [7]) does not apply for the public goods game, this work
thus extends the generality of observations related to the graph
type dependent phase transitions in the low and high K limits
within evolutionary games.
It is interesting to reverse our argumentation and test the
impact of different value ofGwhen the interaction graph con-
tains overlapping triangles. We show in Fig. 4 the full K − r
phase diagram for the triangular lattice (z = 6) at G = 2 (top)
and G = 7 (bottom). Note that this two-dimensional lattice
is made up of overlapping triangles, and hence the transitions
reported above for increasing group size on graphs with zero
or negligible clustering coefficient should not be observable
in this case. In particular, since overlapping triangles are in-
herent to the triangular lattice, already pairwise interactions
(G = 2) preclude the existence of an optimal noise intensity.
The outlay of the upper phase boundary in the top panel of
Fig. 4 fully confirms this expectation, which is also in agree-
ment with results reported earlier for the prisoner’s dilemma
game [28]. Accordingly, when increasing the group size to
G = 7 the qualitative features of the C +D → D transition
line are preserved, and only the critical values of r shift. For
bothG = 2 and G = 7 the lower phase boundary is monoton-
ically descending towards the K → 0 limit, which confirms
the fact that the change in the effective interaction topology
brought about by increasing group size can be observed only
on graphs having a low clustering coefficient, and that only in
the latter case, and if governed by pairwise interactions, the
group size determines the noise dependence of the evolution
of cooperation in spatial public goods games.
IV. SUMMARY
Summarizing, we have studied the evolution of coopera-
tion in public goods games with different group sizes on var-
ious regular graphs. Starting deliberately with lattices that
lack overlapping triangles, we have shown that pairwise in-
teractions result in qualitatively similar behavior as was re-
ported earlier for the prisoner’s dilemma game [21, 28]. In
particular, in this case there exists an intermediate uncertainty
governing the process of strategy adoptions K by which the
lowest enhancement factor r still warrants the survival of at
least some cooperators. By increasing the group size, we have
demonstrated that the features characteristic for pairwise in-
teractions vanish and become qualitatively identical to what
was observed previously on lattices that do incorporate over-
lapping triangles, such as the kagome lattice. Since in fact
the actual interaction topology remains unaffected by the dif-
ferent group sizes, we have argued that the differences in the
evolution of cooperation are due to an effective transition of
the interaction topology, which is brought about by joint mem-
berships of players within the larger groups, resulting in indi-
rect linkages among them. Identical results can also be ob-
tained for increasing group sizes on random regular graphs,
which essentially also have a low clustering coefficient and
thus largely lack overlapping triangles. The latter results con-
firm our conjecture that the noise dependence of cooperation
becomes qualitatively similar in public goods games if the
group size is sufficiently large for a wide class of regular con-
nectivity structures.
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